By Maria E. Sturm
The EU Commission, which is in charge of ensuring the application of the EU principles of competition, has fined Google for breaching Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It found that Google abused its market dominance to restrict search advertising.
The Commission Decision of March 2019 in Detail
Many websites, such as newspaper websites, have embedded search functions. Search results normally include advertisements. Google’s service AdSense for Search works as an intermediary between advertisers and websites. With a market share of over 70% from 2006 to 2016, the EU Commission regards it as dominant in this market.
As competitors cannot sell advertising space on Google’s own search engine result pages, it is crucial for them to get access to third-party websites to compete with Google. However, the EU Commission reviewed a substantial number of individually negotiated contracts between Google and publishers and found that they contain clauses that abusively restrict third-parties’ access to the market. These clauses are:
- “Exclusivity” clauses: publishers were prohibited from placing competitors’ adverts on their search result pages.
- “Premium Placement” clauses: publishers had to reserve the most profitable space for Google’s adverts.
- “Control” clauses: publishers had to inform Google before changing the placement of competitors’ adverts, which gave Google control with regard to interest and number of clicks for competitors’ adverts.
The EU Commission emphasizes that it is not forbidden to have a dominant position in the relevant market. However, it is forbidden to misuse this position. Google has a large market share and, according to the EU Commission, entry barriers to the market are high, due to the substantial investments new competitors must make. The above-mentioned clauses further exacerbate the situation. The clauses led to market restrictions that harmed consumers and competitors without creating efficiencies that would justify Google’s approach. The fine of 1.49 billion is based on 1.29% of Google’s turnover in 2018.
History: Google already fined in 2017
In June 2017, the EU Commission fined Google € 2.42 billion for giving an illegal advantage to its comparison shopping service. Google had a dominant position, as its search engine’s market share exceeded 90% EU-wide for nearly ten years. According to the Commission, market entry barriers are high due to network effects: the more users, the more attractive a search engine is to advertisers. Moreover, the more data the service generates, the better it can optimize its results. As already explained above, it is not forbidden to reach a dominant position, but it is forbidden to abuse it. General search engines and comparison shopping services belong to two different markets. Google used its dominant position in the former as leverage in the latter. For example, Google systematically placed its own comparison shopping service first among the search results, even if this was not how its own search algorithm would have ordered the results. Google also placed its major rivals’ services ‘artificially’ lower in the search results. Consumer behavior has shown that the entry rank – not the quality of the results – decides who receives the most clicks. The most relevant results receive less clicks when they are placed lower on the search results page. The order of search results are even more important on mobile devices, as they have much smaller screens than a computer.
Critique and open questions
As we can see, the EU Commission regarded Google as dominant in the relevant markets and applied the same criteria in both cases. However, some legal scholars have questioned whether the criteria commonly used in antitrust law really fit in the new internet economy. In particular, critics have scrutinized the idea of the dominant position in the relevant market:
- Relevant Market
To be able to confirm that a company has a dominant position, we must first define the relevant market. This can be difficult with regard to online platforms, as online markets are much harder to delineate. One could even argue that online markets bring more good than harm to consumers, because they significantly reduce transaction costs. In addition, the SSNIP test does not work in this economic area, as services are often offered free of charge. Additionally, SSNIP does not consider network effects. Apart from the difficulties in defining the market with regard to content, the geographical definition is challenging, too. Can the market be limited to one nation just by the language criterion? Should we consider that the internet works globally, with English as the international language? In particular, with the improvement of translation programs, language becomes less important as real barrier. A dominant position worldwide is much more difficult to reach and to prove.
- Dominant Position
Users have no contract with Google. In addition, users do not feel the same commitment to stay as they do with social media platforms. Finally, it is crucial to keep in mind the dynamics of the digital economy: monopolies can fail quicker than one might think, and even a market share of 90% is no guarantee of market dominance over the long-run. On the contrary, internet monopolies are primarily known as “contestable monopolies”. Some authors even argue – contrary to the EU Commission – that it is simply impossible to reach a dominant position in the internet economy, for the following reasons:
- Users can easily substitute services such as search engines
- Cost of substitution is low (nearly zero)
- Market entry barriers are low, because a new competitor does not need a lot of infrastructure to set up a new webpage or develop a new app
From my point of view, it is too early to decide where developments in the internet economy will take us. The EU Commission has to make decisions for today, not for the future. However, when applying established antitrust theories to the internet economy, one must pay particular attention to whether these antitrust theories are achieving the same goals in the context of the internet.
 Hoffer/Lehr, Online Plattformen und Big Data auf dem Prüfstand – Gemeinsame Betrachtung der Fälle Amazon, Google und Facebook, NZKart 2019, 10 (12).
 Ibid. 15
 Brauneck, Google: Machtmissbrauch marktbeherrschender Stellung durch Suchmaschinenbetrieb?, GRUR Int. 2018, 103 (104).
 Ibid. 107.
 Ibid. 108.
The Concept of “Irreversible” Transactions and the Application of Ex-post Remedies: the Sky Italia / R2 Decision
By Gabriele Accardo and Sabina Pacifico
On 20 May 2019, the Italian Competition Authority (“ICA” or “Authority“) issued its decision regarding the acquisition by Sky Italian Holding S.p.A. (“Sky“) of certain assets of the digital terrestrial Pay-TV owned by Mediaset Premium S.p.A. (“Mediaset Premium“). The ICA decision imposed significant behavioral remedies to clear the transaction, which the parties decided to close prior to clearance. Sky is the dominant player in the market for Pay-TV services in Italy, and Mediaset Premium was the only significant competitor in the market.
Between March and November 2018, Sky and Mediaset Premium entered into a number of preliminary interrelated agreements in view of the sale of R2 S.r.l. (“R2“) to Sky. R2 is a company established in May 2018, through the transfer of a business branch of Mediaset Premium, that carries out technical and administrative activities necessary for companies offering Pay-TV services (such as the management of signal encryption, commercial services, administrative management of customers, activation and deactivation of services, call centers and assistance) and runs the terrestrial digital broadcasting technical platform of Mediaset Premium.
On 28 November 2018, Sky and Mediaset Premium submitted the merger filing to the ICA and two days later the transaction was closed without waiting for the clearance decision of the Authority (there is no stand-still obligation under Italian merger control rules), therefore facing the risk of significant remedies being imposed.
On 28 March 2019 the ICA sent a Statement of Objections (“SO“) to the two companies, wherein it raised serious doubts as to the compatibility of the transaction with the competition rules.
The preliminary conclusions in the SO
In the SO, the Authority made clear its competition concerns and highlighted its intention to block the merger or to authorize it with remedies, chiefly due to the following issues:
- The transaction would have strengthened Sky’s already dominant position in the (i) retail market for Pay-TV services – since Mediaset Premium was its sole direct significant competitor – and in the (ii) market for wholesale access to the technical platform used to offer paid digital terrestrial services.
- As a result of the transaction, Sky would be the sole provider of access services to the technical platform necessary for Pay-TV services by triggering the exit of Mediaset Premium from the market. According to the ICA, the mere acquisition of R2 would have the same (anticompetitive) effects as Sky acquiring the entire Mediaset Premium.
In essence, buying R2 allowed Sky to instantly reach almost five million additional customers who already have an R2 smartcard or set-top box.
The Decision and the behavioural remedies
Following the concerns set out in the SO, and the clear intention of the Authority to, at best, clear the transaction only with significant remedies, Sky dropped the plan to acquire R2 and withdrew the merger filing.
However, on 5 April the ICA approved the merger by imposing behavioural measures, having concluded that the transaction had already produced irreversible anticompetitive effects in the market.
In fact, as a result of the transaction, Mediaset Premium’s clients migrated to Sky. According to the ICA, once the clients have moved to a different competitor, the effects of the acquisition are irreversible.
Thus, the ICA could not help but imposing remedies aimed at restoring the competitive level that had been reduced by the exit of the main – and sole – significant competitor from the Pay-TV market.
Under the conditions imposed by the ICA, Sky:
- will be prohibited from entering into exclusive rights for audiovisual content and linear channels for internet platforms in Italy for three years in order to restore the level playing field in the market for Pay-TV services and allowing other operators that provide their services through internet;
- shall grant access to competitors to any new platform it may develop that is compatible with the R2’s assets, under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions.
The case shows that the peculiar features of digital markets, such as the Pay-TV market, necessitate close scrutiny of the effects of a transaction in the market, prior to the transaction’s completion. In cases like the one at issue, once a transaction has been completed, it may be difficult – if not impossible – to restore the status quo ante. Therefore, extensive remedies may be expected, since even the “de-merge” would not be enough.
In the case at issue, the returning of R2 to Mediaset Premium could not, according to the ICA, eliminate the anticompetitive effects caused by the transaction – as these occurred before the filing and, most importantly, prior to the clearance decision.
The conclusion reached by the Authority is quite innovative insofar as it approved a transaction and imposed ex post remedies. This decision may further fuel the international debate regarding the approaches that competition authorities may adopt in the face of the challenges posed by the digital economy.
The European Commission Settles the Long-running Antitrust Case with Gazprom by Agreeing on Commitments
By Kristina Povazanova
After almost seven years, the European Commission (“Commission”) settled its long-running antitrust case with the Russian energy giant, PJSC Gazprom and its wholly-own subsidiary Gazprom Export LLC (“Gazprom”), concerning the abuse of a dominant position according to Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) that may have hindered the free flow of gas at competitive prices in Central and Eastern European countries (jointly referred to as “CEE”).
On 24 May 2018, the Commission adopted a decision in accordance with Article 9(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, (“Regulation 1/2003”) making commitments offered by Gazprom legally binding. These are meant to facilitate the integration of CEE gas markets and to enable efficient cross-border gas flow in contrast to alleged abuse of Gazprom’s dominant position on those markets.
Procedural aspects of Gazprom case
From 2011 to 2015, the Commission undertook several investigative measures to assess the situation in CEE gas markets. These included on-the-spot inspections in accordance with Article 20(4) Regulation 1/2003 as well as various information inquiries. On the basis of these investigative steps, the Commission opened formal proceedings with an intention to adopt a decision under Chapter III of the Regulation 1/2003. In its Statement of Objections (“SO”) of 22 April 2015, the Commission came to a preliminary conclusion that Gazprom is a dominant player in CEE markets for the upstream wholesale supply of natural gas, and that it might have abused its dominant position due to three potentially abusive practices:
- Gazprom included territorial restrictions in its gas supply contracts with wholesalers and other customers. These restrictions comprised: 1) destination clauses that obliged wholesalers to use the purchased gas only in a specific territory; and 2) export bans that prevented the free flow of natural gas to other countries. Gazprom required the wholesalers to obtain its approval to export gas to other countries and obstructed the change of location to which the natural gas was being delivered (the so-called gas delivery points). The aim of such restrictions may have been to hinder the integrity of the internal market by supposedly re-instating CEE national borders for the gas flow in exchange for securing Gazprom’s pricing policy in CEE gas markets.
- According to the SO, territorial restrictions went hand-in-hand with an unfair pricing policy in several CEE countries. As a result of these practices, wholesalers were charged prices that were significantly higher than Gazprom’s comparable costs or benchmark prices. This may have been caused by Gazprom’s price formulae that linked the contractual gas prices to oil indexation disregarding prices in European liquid gas hubs.
- Last, but not least, the Commission pointed out that Gazprom leveraged its dominant position in relevant CEE gas markets by stipulating conditions for gas supplies and gas prices in Bulgaria and Poland that were dependent on obtaining unrelated infrastructure commitments, like investments in Gazprom’s pipeline projects (e.g. South Stream project).
It wasn’t long before Gazprom sent its reply to the SO, disputing the Commission’s preliminary assessment. As the world’s largest natural gas reserves holder and exclusive undertaking to export natural gas from Russia, Gazprom’s natural gas exports to Europe reached 194.4 billion cubic meters in 2017. The Commissioner, however, made it clear that all companies that operate in the European market have to comply with EU rules, notwithstanding their status.
Proposal of the First Commitments
To address the Commission’s antitrust concerns, Gazprom proposed the first set of commitments (“First Commitments”) to ensure the free flow of natural gas at competitive prices in CEE gas markets. However, one must bear in mind that Gazprom tried to challenge the Commission from the very beginning. In its First Commitments, Gazprom stated that “this proposal of Commitments does not constitute an acknowledgement that Article 102 TFEU or Article 54 EAA Agreement or indeed any other substantive rule of EU competition law has been breached.”
The First Commitments offered by Gazprom were regarded by the Commission as addressing competition concerns in CEE gas markets. Gazprom addressed all three issues, by ensuring that:
- It will refrain from using and will not introduce in the future any territorial restrictions, such as destination clauses and export bans or any other measures having equivalent effect, in their gas supply contracts, effect of which could be the limitation or prohibition of customer’s ability to resell natural gas supplied by Gazprom or to transfer the natural gas to another territory. With respect to market segmentation and specifically the isolation of Bulgarian gas market, Gazprom offered to change relevant gas supply and gas transport contracts to allow Bulgaria to conclude interconnection agreements with other EU Member States (mainly Greece). This commitment, together with the adjustment of the current gas allocation method, would enable the Bulgarian transmission system operator to gain full control of the gas flow in Bulgaria. In relation to gas delivery points that are considered as crucial for the free flow of gas in CEE gas markets, Gazprom committed to allow its CEE customers to request all or part of their gas volume to be delivered to Bulgaria or Baltic States instead of their delivery points.
- It will introduce the price revision clause in gas supply contracts to address the Commission’s unfair pricing This will apply to customers whose gas supply contracts do not contain a price revision clause. Otherwise, Gazprom committed to amend existing price revision clauses to enable its customers to request the price revision if either the economic situation in the European gas market is subject to change or the price does not reflect current trends and developments at liquid gas hubs in Western Europe. Gazprom proposed that its customers can request such a revision every two years. Importantly, Gazprom agreed that in case of the absence of mutual agreement on the revised price within 120 days, the conflict matter will be referred to arbitration.
- It will allow Bulgarian partners to leave the South Stream project and will refrain from claiming damages on the basis of this cancelation for the initial period of eight consecutive years. This commitment should have addressed the Commission’s concern that Gazprom gained unjustified advantages resulting from stipulating conditions for gas supplies and gas prices in Bulgaria dependent on obtaining unrelated infrastructure commitments.
On 16 March 2017, the Commission invited interested third parties to comment and submit their observation on the First Commitments, pursuant to Article 24(7) Regulation 1/2003. The Commission received forty-four responses from interested third parties that dealt with various aspects of the First Commitments, ranging from technical elements to substantive issues, such as: a) Gazprom’s responsibility for gas quality at entry points to either Bulgaria or changed gas delivery hubs, b) creation of bi-directional basis mechanism between gas delivery points of the Baltic States/Bulgaria and Central/Eastern Europe, or c) methodology behind the fee to be charged by Gazprom for a change of gas delivery point.
In response to these observations, Gazprom submitted a modified version of the First Commitments on 15 March 2018 (“Commitments”). It addressed various minor and major comments. Among the most important modifications, Gazprom agreed to:
- delete the reference that all commitments are only made for the duration of the Commitments;
- remain liable for the gas quality at the entry point to Bulgaria;
- offer the change of delivery points on a bi-directional basis in CEE gas markets;
- remain liable for non-delivery of gas to changed gas delivery points except of force majeure and maintenance;
- reduce the service fee for a swap-like operation including bi-directional flow;
- extend the scope of price revision clause by offering it to new customers as well;
- specify what are the benchmark prices for liquid hubs in continental Europe by listing TTF gas hub in the Netherlands and NCG hub in Germany;
- place the arbitration place for the price revision conflict matter within the EU;
- refrain from bringing any claims related to the South Stream project for a period of fifteen years.
Despite the strong opposition from few CEE Member States (e.g. Poland), the Commission is convinced that the Commitments impose positive forward-looking set of obligations on Gazprom to enable the free flow of gas in CEE gas markets at competitive prices. Their purpose is to bring Gazprom’s market behavior in compliance with EU competition rules and to allow customers to benefit from effective gas competition between various gas suppliers and supply sources. By adopting the decision in accordance with Article 9(1) Regulation 1/2003, the Commission made the Commitments legally binding on Gazprom and any legal entity that is directly or indirectly controlled by Gazprom for the period of eight years.
In case that Gazprom breaks the Commitments, the Commission can impose a fine of up to 10% of the company’s annual turnover, without having to prove an infringement of EU competition rules.
 Namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia.
 Case AT.39816 – Upstream Gas Supplies in Central and Eastern Europe  OJ C258/07
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty; Official Journal L 001, 04/01/2003 P. 0001 – 0025
 Article 9(1) Regulation 1/2003 provides: “Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement be brought to an end and the undertakings concerned offer commitments to meet the concerns expressed to them by the Commission in its preliminary assessment, the Commission may by decision make those commitments binding on the undertakings.”
 The Commission opened proceedings on 31 August 2012.
 The first set of Commitments was submitted to the European Commission on 14 February 2017.
 Commitment Proposal – Non-confidential Version http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/g2/gazprom_commitments.pdf (online; available on 20 July 2018)
 In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia the gas connecting infrastructure such as mechanisms for reverse flow and interconnectors has significantly improved. On the other hand, the Baltic States and Bulgaria are still very much isolated from the rest of CEE Member States.
 As regards the Yamal Pipeline, the Commission’s investigation showed that the situation cannot be changed by this antitrust procedure due to the impact of an intergovernmental agreement between Poland and Russia.
 E.g. PGNIG S.A.: ‘PGNiG S.A. observations on the commitments proposed by Gazprom on the basis of Article 9 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16th of December 2002 in Case AT.39816 — Upstream gas supplies in central and eastern Europe’ http://pgnig.pl/aktualnosci/-/news-list/id/oswiadczenie-pgn-1/newsGroupId/10184 (online; press release of 19 May 2017)
By Nicole Daniel
On 22 March 2018, in a court hearing in the Qualcomm case, Judge Koh expressed her concern over possible abuses in asserting legal privilege over certain documents.
In January 2017, the U.S. FTC sued Qualcomm, alleging that the company consistently refused to license its essential patents to competitors, thereby violating its pledge to standards organizations that it would license them on FRAND terms (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory). Allegedly, Qualcomm also engaged in a policy of withholding processors unless its customers agreed to patent licensing terms favorable to Qualcomm. A trial is set for January 2019.
Furthermore, a class action alleged that Qualcomm’s behavior raised the prices of devices operating with its chips.
At the hearing, judge Koh said she is “deeply disturbed” by the very high percentage of privilege assertions by Qualcomm. However, Qualcomm continues to produce documents after reviewing them again and removing earlier assertions of privilege. Judge Koh expressed her concerns at the court hearing several times and said that she will allow witnesses to be redeposed, as often as necessary, until all documents are available before testimony.
This issue centers around documents from Apple and other customers which were gathered under an EU investigation into the baseband chipsets market. Even though the plaintiffs have already obtained a redacted version of the Commission’s January 2017 decision fining Qualcomm EUR 997 million, they ask for an unredacted version. In this decision, Qualcomm was fined for paying Apple to refrain from buying rival manufacturers’ chips.
The U.S. plaintiffs argue that Qualcomm should have simply asked for third parties’ permission to share the information given to the EU investigators. Qualcomm in turn argued that it cannot circumvent EU law by making the disclosures asked for and referred to the version of the decision to be published by the Commission. In the public version, the Commission makes its own redactions. The U.S. plaintiffs further argued that they contacted Apple, as well as its contracted manufacturers, and those parties do not object to disclosure. Qualcomm replied that they could simply ask them directly for the information. In sum, the U.S. plaintiffs called Qualcomm’s behavior unfair, as it prevents them from fully understanding the EU decision.
Until early May 2018, no public version of the Commission was available. The Commission and the companies involved are still in the process of deciding on a version of the decision that does not contain any business secrets or other confidential information.
Qualcomm’s Acquisition of NXP Receives Antitrust Clearance by the European Commission, Subject to Commitments
By Kletia Noti
On 28 April 2017, the European Commission (“Commission”) received, pursuant to the EU Merger Regulation, notification of a proposed concentration involving the acquisition, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the EU Merger Regulation, of NXP Semiconductors N.V., a Dutch global semiconductor manufacturer headquartered in Eindhoven, Netherlands, by Qualcomm Incorporated, a United States company world leader in 3G, 4G and next-generation wireless technologies, through its indirect wholly owned subsidiary Qualcomm River Holdings B.V..
On 9 June 2017, the Commission announced that it was launching an in-depth market investigation (Phase II review). The investigation rests, at least in part, on the basis of conglomerate theories of harm (as will be better seen infra) that resulted from the Commission’s initial market investigation during Phase I. To do away with the Commission’s concerns, Qualcomm submitted a series of commitments (see infra).
On 18 January 2018, the Commission announced that it would clear the proposed transaction, as modified by the commitments, on the ground that it would no longer raise competition concerns. The Commission’s clearance decision is conditional upon Qualcomm’s full compliance with the commitments.
At present, Qualcomm has already received approval from eight of nine required global regulators to finalize the acquisition of NXP. The only exception is China, where clearance is currently pending, amid USA-China trade tensions. Should all the regulatory approvals not be in place by the deadline of 25 July, 2018, Qualcomm’s holding company, Qualcomm River Holdings B.V., will pay NXP a termination fee.
A background: the companies
Qualcomm Incorporated (Qualcomm) is engaged in the development and commercialization of a digital communication technology called code division multiple access (CDMA). Qualcomm is mostly known for mainly developing and supplying baseband chipsets for smartphones, i.e. chips that allow smartphones to connect to cellular networks.
Qualcomm is divided into two main segments: (i) Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (‘QCT’) and; (ii) Qualcomm Technology Licensing (‘QTL’). QCT is a supplier of integrated circuits and system software based on CDMA, Orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA), one of the key elements of the LTE standard, and other technologies for use in voice and data communications, networking, application processing, multimedia and global positioning system products. QTL grants licenses or otherwise provides rights to use portions of Qualcomm Incorporated’s intellectual property portfolio, which, among other rights, includes certain patent rights essential to and/or useful in the manufacture and sale of certain wireless products.
NXP Semiconductors N.V. (NXP) is active in the manufacturing and sale of semiconductors, in particular integrated circuits (‘ICs’) and single unit semiconductors. NXP sells broadly two categories of products, standard products and high performance mixed signal (“HPMS”) devices. NXP’s HPMS business includes application-specific semiconductors and system solutions for: (i) Automotive; (ii) Secure Identification Solutions; (iii) Secure Connected Devices; and (iv) Secure Interfaces and Power. The semiconductors supplied by NXP, including near-field communication (NFC) and secure element (SE) chips for smartphones, are chips enabling short-range connectivity, which are used in particular for secure payment transactions on smartphones.
NXP has also developed and owns MIFARE, a leading technology used as a ticketing/fare collection platform by several transport authorities in the European Economic Area (EEA).
On October 2016, Qualcomm and NXP announced a definitive agreement, unanimously approved by the boards of directors of both companies, under which Qualcomm would acquire NXP by way of a share purchase acquisition carried out through Qualcomm River Holdings B.V. On May 11, 2018, Qualcomm Incorporated announced that Qualcomm River Holdings B.V. has extended the offering period of its previously announced cash tender offer to purchase all of the outstanding common shares of NXP Semiconductors N.V. (NASDAQ: NXPI) until May 25, 2018.
The Commission’s concerns and the in-depth investigation
Following its initial market investigation, the Commission had several concerns about semiconductors used in mobile devices and the automotive industry.
Concerns in the markets for chipsets used in mobile devices
Conglomerate effects’ theory of harm
More specifically, the Commission’s market investigation showed that, since the merged entity would hold strong market positions within both baseband chipsets (mainly developed and supplied by Qualcomm) and near field communication (NFC)/secure element (SE) chips (supplied by NXP), it would have had the ability and incentive to exclude Qualcomm’s and NXP’s rival suppliers from the markets (through practices such as bundling or tying).
Concerns in the merged entity’s licencing practices related to parties’ significant intellectual property portfolios
Since the merged entity would have combined the two undertakings’ significant intellectual property (IP) portfolios, in particular with respect to the NFC technology, the Commission was additionally concerned that, post-merger, the Commission would have had the ability and incentive to modify NXP’s current IP licensing practices, in relation to NFC’s technology, including by means of bundling the NFC IP to Qualcomm’s patent portfolio.
According to the Commission, this could have caused the merged entity to avail itself of a stronger buying power vis-à-vis customers than absent the transaction. The Commission opined that this would have led to anticompetitive effects in the relevant market, including by means of higher royalties for the NCF patent licences and/or competitors’ foreclosure.
Concerns in the markets for semiconductors used in the automotive sector
An additional Commission concern was that the merged entity resulting from the proposed acquisition would have removed competition between in the markets for semiconductors used in the automotive sector, and, more specifically, the emerging Vehicle-to-Everything (“V2X”) technology, which will play an important role in the future development of “connected cars” (through which cars can “talk” to other cars).
Phase II investigation
On 21 June 2017, the Commission launched its Phase II market test.
The Commission’s in-depth market investigation during Phase II of the merger review confirmed some of its initial concerns.
Concerns related to MIFARE
One of the Commission’s concerns was that the merged entity would have had the ability and incentive to make it more difficult for other suppliers to access NXP’s MIFARE technology (a contactless security technology platform used as a ticketing/fare collection platform by EEA transport authorities) by possibly raising licencing royalties and/or refusing to licence such technology, thus resulting in potential anticompetitive foreclosure effects for competitors.
Concerns related to interoperability
In addition, the Commission also noted that, due to Qualcomm’s strong position in the supply of baseband chipsets and NPX’s strong position in the supply of near field communication (NFC)/SE chips, the merged entity would have had the incentive and ability to reduce interoperability of such chipsets with those of rival supplies. The Commission feared that this, in turn, could have resulted in competitors’ foreclosure.
Concern related to the merged-entity’s licencing practices
Finally, the in-depth investigation also confirmed concerns that the merged entity would have had the ability and incentive to modify NXP’s current IP licensing practices for NFC technology, which could have led the merged entity to charge significantly higher royalties.
By contrast, the Commission’s initial concerns concerning the markets for semiconductors in the automotive sector were not confirmed.
Concerns related to MIFARE
As seen above, some of the Commission concerns related to possible rivals’ foreclosure effects through actual or constructive refusal to supply of the MIFARE technology.
To address the Commission’s concerns, Qualcomm committed “from the Closing Date and for a period of eight (8) years thereafter, upon written request by any Third Party, to grant any such Third Party a nonexclusive MIFARE License also involving the use of MIFARE Trademarks on commercial terms (including with regard to the fee, scope and duration of the license) which are at least as advantageous as those offered by NXP in existing MIFARE Licenses on the Effective Date”.
Qualcomm also committed “to offer to MIFARE Licensees, on commercially reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, the extension of the MIFARE Licenses for MIFARE Implementation in an Integrated Secure Element.”
Concerns related to interoperability
A second element of the Commission’s concerns related to the merged entity’s ability and incentive to degrade interoperability of Qualcomm’s baseband chipsets and NPX’s products.
In this respect, Qualcomm also undertook “from the Closing Date, on a worldwide basis and for a period of eight (8) years thereafter to ensure the same level of Interoperability, including, but not limited to, functionality and performance, between: (a) Qualcomm Baseband Chipsets and NXP Products, and the Third Party’s NFC Chips, Secure Element Chips, Integrated Secure Element or NFC/SE or Secure Element Technology; and (b) NXP Products and the Third Party’s Baseband Chipset or Applications Processor as will exist at any point in time between Qualcomm’s Baseband Chipsets and NXP’s Products, unless Qualcomm demonstrates to the Commission by means of a reasoned and documented submission to the Trustee that there are technical characteristics of the Third Party’s products that do not allow Qualcomm to achieve the same level of Interoperability, such as generational differences between Qualcomm’s and the Third Party’s respective chips”.
Concern related to the merged-entity’s licencing practices
The market analysis confirmed the Commission’s initial competition concerns with respect to the licensing of NXP’s NFC patents as a result of the transaction, as seen supra.
Qualcomm committed to not acquire NXP’s NFC standard-essential patents (SEPs) as well as certain of NXP’s NFC non SEPs. NXP undertook to transfer the abovementioned patents that Qualcomm commits not to acquire to a third party, which would be under an obligation to grant a worldwide royalty free licence to such patents for a period of three years. At the same time, with respect to some of NXP’s NFC non-SEPs that Qualcomm would have acquired, in order to do away with the Commission’s concerns, Qualcomm committed, for as long as the merged entity would own these patents, not to enforce rights with respect to these patents vis-à-vis other parties and to grant a worldwide royalty licence with respect to these parties.
On 18 January 2018, the Commission rendered public its decision to clear the proposed transaction, as modified by the commitments submitted by Qualcomm, on the grounds that such commitments would suffice to do away with its competition concerns.
The Commission’s clearance decision is rendered conditional upon Qualcomm’s full compliance with the commitments. A Monitoring Trustee, namely one or more natural or legal person(s) who is/are approved by the Commission and appointed by Qualcomm, has the duty to monitor Qualcomm’s compliance with the obligations attached to this Decision.
Pending sign-off from China’s regulator, the transaction remains incomplete. At Qualcomm, hopes remain high that the situation will be finalized soon.
 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EU Merger Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance) Official Journal L 024 , 29/01/2004 P. 0001 – 0022. Under Article 4(1), It is mandatory to notify concentrations with an EU dimension to the European Commission for clearance.
 See prior notification of a concentration (Case M.8306 — Qualcomm/NXP Semiconductors), OJ C 143, 6.5.2017, p. 6–6.
 After notification, the Commission has 25 working days to analyze the deal during the Phase I investigation. If there are competition concerns, companies can offer remedies, which extends the phase I deadline by 10 working days. At the end of a phase I investigation: (a) the merger is cleared, either unconditionally or subject to accepted remedies; or
(b) the merger still raises competition concerns and the Commission opens a Phase II in-depth investigation. If Phase II is opened, the Commission has 90 further working days to examine the concentration. This period can be extended by 15 working days when the notifying parties offer commitments. With the parties’ consent, it can be extended by up to 20 working days.
Brussels, 18 January 2018, press release, “Mergers: Commission approves Qualcomm’s acquisition of NXP, subject to conditions”, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-347_en.htm
Under Article 6(2) EUMR, “Where the Commission finds that, following modification by the undertakings concerned, a notified concentration no longer raises serious doubts within the meaning of paragraph 1(c), it shall declare the concentration compatible with the common market pursuant to paragraph 1(b). The Commission may attach to its decision under paragraph 1(b) conditions and obligations intended to ensure that the undertakings concerned comply with the commitments they have entered into vis-à-vis the Commission with a view to rendering the concentration compatible with the common market.”
On request of China’s commerce ministry (MOFCOM), just days before the regulator’s April 17, 2018 deadline to decide on whether to clear the transaction expired, Qualcomm withdrew its earlier application to MOFCOM on April 14, 2018, and, in concomitance with such withdrawal, it re-filed a new application to obtain clearance of the proposed transaction. See M.Miller, April 16, 2018, Qualcomm to refile China antitrust application for $44 billion NXP takeover: sources, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-qualcomm-antitrust/qualcomm-to-refile-china-antitrust-application-for-44-billion-nxp-takeover-sources and Qualcomm Press Release, Qualcomm and NXP Agree, at MOFCOM Request, to Withdraw and Refile Application for Chinese Regulatory Approval, April 16, 2018: https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2018/04/19/qualcomm-and-nxp-agree-mofcom-request-withdraw-and-refile-application.
 A. Barry, “Stock Selloff Hurts Arbitrage Traders”, 3 May 2018, https://www.barrons.com/articles/stock-selloff-hurts-arbitrage-traders-1525369030
 Qualcomm Press Release, Qualcomm and NXP Agree, at MOFCOM Request, to Withdraw and Refile Application for Chinese Regulatory Approval, April 16, 2018: https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2018/04/19/qualcomm-and-nxp-agree-mofcom-request-withdraw-and-refile-application.
 Qualcomm Press Release, Qualcomm to acquire NXP, 27 October 2016, available at: https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2016/10/27/qualcomm-acquire-nxp.
 Qualcomm Press Release, Qualcomm extends cash tender offer for all outstanding shares of NXP, May 11, 2018, available at: https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2018/05/11/qualcomm-extends-cash-tender-offer-all-outstanding-shares-nxp
 See, for a non-confidential interim text of the commitments, Case M.8306 – QUALCOMM / NXP SEMICONDUCTORS, Commitments to the European Commission, published on 24 January 2018, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/additional_data/m8306_3395_3.pdf
Brussels, 18 January 2018, press release, “Mergers: Commission approves Qualcomm’s acquisition of NXP, subject to conditions”, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-347_en.htm
See above, foonote 4.
 Under Article 6(2) EUMR, “Where the Commission finds that, following modification by the undertakings concerned, a notified concentration no longer raises serious doubts within the meaning of paragraph 1(c), it shall declare the concentration compatible with the common market pursuant to paragraph 1(b). The Commission may attach to its decision under paragraph 1(b) conditions and obligations intended to ensure that the undertakings concerned comply with the commitments they have entered into vis-à-vis the Commission with a view to rendering the concentration compatible with the common market.”
By Giuseppe Colangelo
The online sales phenomenon – and all the issues deriving from vertical restraints – has attracted significant attention in recent years in several EU Member States. This attention arises mainly from a question regarding the extent to which restrictions limiting the ability of retailers to sell via online marketplaces are compatible with competition rules.
The findings of the recent E-commerce Sector Inquiry [COM (2017) 229 final] indicate that absolute marketplace bans should not be considered to be hardcore restrictions within the meaning of Article 4(b) and Article 4(c) of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (330/2010). However, as recalled by the Commission, this approach has been affirmed pending the CJEU’s decision in the Coty Prestige case. Indeed, the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main essentially asked the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) whether a ban on using third party platforms in a selective distribution agreement is compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU and whether such a restriction constitutes a restriction of competition by object.
No wonder Coty was so anticipated. The judgment is expected to shape the future of EU e-commerce affecting online markets, the luxury industry and Internet platforms.
The request for a preliminary ruling has been submitted in the context of a dispute between a supplier of luxury cosmetics (Coty Germany) and its authorized distributor (Parfümerie Akzente), concerning the prohibition, under the selective distribution agreement, of the use of third-party undertakings for Internet sales. In particular, Parfümerie Akzente distributes Coty goods both at its brick-and-mortar locations and over the Internet. In the latter case, sales are carried out partly through its own online store and partly via the Amazon platform.
According to Coty, the selective distribution system is required in order to support the luxury image of its brands. In this respect, the selective distribution agreement, as it pertains to Internet sales, provides that the authorized retailer is not permitted to use a different name or to engage a third-party undertaking which has not been authorized. The dispute at issue arose when Parfümerie Akzente refused to sign amendments regarding Internet sales activity. They prohibited the use of a different business name and the recognizable engagement of a third-party undertaking which is not an authorized retailer of Coty Prestige. Thus, according to these amendments, the authorized retailer is prohibited from collaborating with third parties if such collaboration is directed at the operation of the website and is affected in a manner that is discernible to the public.
In response to the action brought by Coty to prohibit Parfümerie Akzente from distributing products via Amazon, the German court of first instance found that, in accordance with Pierre Fabre ruling (C-439/09), the objective of maintaining a prestigious image of the mark could not justify the introduction of a selective distribution system which restricts competition. Further, according to the national court, the contractual clause at issue constituted a hardcore restriction under Article 4(c) of the Regulation. It did not meet the conditions for an individual exemption, since it has not been shown that the general exclusion of Internet sales via third-party platforms entails efficiency gains that offset the disadvantages for competition that result from the clause. Moreover, the court considered such a general prohibition unnecessary, since there were other equally appropriate but less restrictive means, such as the application of specific quality criteria for the third-party platforms.
In these circumstances, the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main requests a preliminary ruling asking: (i) whether selective distribution networks aimed at preserving the image of luxury goods are caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU; (ii) whether, in the same context, Article 101(1) precludes a contractual clause which prohibits authorized distributors from using, in a discernible manner, third-party platforms for Internet sales, without consideration of whether there is any actual breach of the legitimate requirements of the manufacturer in terms of quality; (iii and iv) whether Article 4(b) and (c) of the Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that such a third-party platform ban constitutes a restriction by object of the retailer’s customer group or of passive sales to end users.
The questions reflect the diverging interpretations of Pierre Fabre by the national competition authorities and courts. Thus, the case provides the CJEU with the opportunity to clarify the meaning of Pierre Fabre.
Sidestepping Pierre Fabre
By answering the first question, the CJEU recalls that since Metro (C-26/76 and C-75/84), the Court has recognized the legality of selective distribution networks based on qualitative criteria. Notably, according to the conditions set by the case law to ensure the compatibility of a selective distribution network with Article 101(1) TFEU, resellers must be chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature, which are determined uniformly for all potential resellers and applied in a non-discriminatory manner; the characteristics of the product necessitate such a selective distribution network in order to preserve its quality and ensure its proper use; the criteria defined must not go beyond what is necessary.
In the context of luxury goods, it follows from the case law that, due to their characteristics and their nature, those goods may require the implementation of a selective distribution system in order to preserve their quality and to ensure that they are used properly. Indeed, as highlighted by the Copad judgment (C-59/08), the quality of luxury goods is not just the result of their material characteristics, but also of their allure and prestige. As prestige goods are high-end goods, the aura of luxury they emanate is essential in that it enables consumers to distinguish them from similar goods and, therefore, an impairment to that aura is likely to affect the actual quality of those goods. For these reasons, the characteristics and conditions of a selective distribution system may preserve the quality and ensure the proper use of luxury goods. The CJEU in Copad held that the establishment of a selective distribution system which seeks to ensure that the goods are displayed in sales outlets in a manner that enhances their value contributes to the reputation of the goods, and therefore contributes to sustaining the aura of luxury surrounding them.
Therefore, once the Metro criteria are met, a selective distribution system designed primarily to preserve the luxury image of those goods is compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU. This outcome is not challenged by Pierre Fabre. The assertion contained in paragraph 46 of that case (“The aim of maintaining a prestigious image is not a legitimate aim for restricting competition and cannot therefore justify a finding that a contractual clause pursuing such an aim does not fall within Article 101(1) TFEU”) is confined to the context of that judgment and consequently does not alter the settled case law. Notably, that assertion is related solely to the goods at issue (“the goods covered by the selective distribution system at issue in that case were not luxury goods, but cosmetic and body hygiene goods”) and to the contractual clause in question in Pierre Fabre (a general and absolute ban on Internet sales). Therefore, the selective distribution system in its entirety was not at issue.
The same line of reasoning guides the CJEU’s answer to the second question, which is related to the lawfulness of a specific clause prohibiting authorized retailers from using, in a discernible manner, third-party platforms for Internet sales of luxury products.
The contractual clause must be evaluated in light of the Metro criteria. The CJEU recalls that it indisputable that the clause at issue: i) pursues the objective of preserving the image of luxury and prestige of the contractual goods; ii) is objective and uniform; iii) is applied without discrimination to all authorized retailers. Therefore, the lawfulness of the third-party platforms prohibition is a matter of proportionality. Hence, an assessment is required as to whether such a prohibition is appropriate for preserving the luxury image of the contractual goods and whether it goes beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.
As regards the appropriateness of the prohibition at issue, the CJEU considers the contractual clause justified by the need to preserve the luxury image of the products in light of three arguments. Indeed, the third-party platforms ban is coherent with the aim of: i) guaranteeing that the contract goods will be exclusively associated with authorized distributors; ii) monitoring the qualitative criteria according to which the products are sold (the absence of a contractual relationship between the supplier and third-party platforms prevents the former from being able to require compliance with the quality conditions imposed on the authorized retailers); iii) contributing to the high-end image among consumers (those platforms constitute a sales channel for goods of all kinds, while the chief value of a luxury good lies in the fact that it is not too common).
With regard to the question of whether the prohibition goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective pursued, the clause at issue is clearly distinguished from the one sanctioned in Pierre Fabre, since it does not contain an absolute prohibition on online sales. Indeed, authorized retailers are allowed to distribute the contract goods online via their own websites and third-party platforms, when the use of such platforms is not discernible to consumers.
The CJEU also relies on this argument to answer the third and fourth questions raised by the referring court. Even if the clause at issue restricts a specific kind of Internet sale, it does not amount to a restriction within the meaning of Article 4(b) and (c) of the Regulation, since it does not preclude all online sales, but only one of a number of ways of reaching customers via the Internet. Indeed, the contractual clause even allows, under certain conditions, authorized retailers to advertise on third-party platforms and to use online search engines. Moreover, it is not possible ex ante to identify a customer group or a particular market to which users of third-party platforms would correspond. Therefore, the content of the clause does not have the effect of partitioning territories or of limiting access to certain customers.
In summary, in line with the position expressed by the Commission in the Sector Inquiry, the CJEU states that absolute marketplace bans should not be considered as hardcore restrictions since, contrary to the restriction at stake in Pierre Fabre, they do not amount to prohibition on selling online and do not restrict the effective use of the Internet as a sales channel.
Some open issues
Despite the clarity of the CJEU’s findings, there is a matter of interpretation related to the potential limitation of the judgment solely to genuine luxury products. Indeed, the CJEU also distinguishes Coty from Pierre Fabre on the grounds that the latter did not concern a luxury product: “the goods covered by the selective distribution system at issue in [Pierre Fabre] were not luxury goods, but cosmetic and body hygiene goods. … The assertion in paragraph 46 of that judgment related, therefore, solely to the goods at issue in the case that gave rise to that judgment and to the contractual clause in question in that case”.
In that respect, the wording of the CJEU is unfortunate. First, the proposed exclusion of cosmetic and body hygiene products from the luxury landscape is far from convincing. Further, the uncertainty about the scope of the ruling may generate litigation over the prestige of some goods, since national enforcers may adopt different approach and manufacturers would seek protection against online marketplace sales for products whose luxury features are questionable. Indeed, the CJEU does not define the notion of luxury, but relies on Copad, stating that the quality of such goods is not just the result of their material characteristics, but also of the allure and prestigious image which bestow on them an aura of luxury. That aura is essential in that it enables consumers to distinguish them from similar goods.
A few days after the Coty judgement, the German Federal Court of Justice, in evaluating ASICS’s online restrictions, stated that sports and running shoes are not luxury goods. Previously, on 4 October 2017 the District Court of Amsterdam, referring to the Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Coty, reached a different conclusion about Nike shoes and ruled in favor of Nike in an action against a distributor (Action Sport), which had not complied with the selective distribution policy.
A narrow interpretation of the Coty judgement would be at odds with the settled case law, which holds that it is the specific characteristics or properties of the products concerned that may be capable of rendering a selective distribution system compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU. As pointed out by the Advocate General, the CJEU has already made clear that irrespective even of whether the products concerned are luxury products, a selective distribution system may be necessary in order to preserve the quality of the product. In the same vein, according to the Commission’s Guidelines, qualitative and quantitative selective distribution is exempted regardless of both the nature of the product concerned and the nature of the selection criteria as long as the characteristics of the product necessitate selective distribution or require the applied criteria. It is the properties of the products concerned, whether they lie in the physical characteristics of the products (such as high-quality products or technologically advanced products) or in their luxury or prestige image, that must be preserved.
However, the mentioned ambiguity does not seem to have a significant impact in practice. Indeed, whether or not an online marketplace ban should be considered as hardcore restrictions within the meaning of Article 4(b) and (c) of the Regulation does not depend on the nature of products. Since, according to the CJEU’s finding, absolute marketplace bans are not hardcore restrictions, a case-by-case analysis of effects will be required for both luxury and non-luxury goods.
 Coty Germany GmbH v. Parfümerie Akzente GmbH (C-230/16).
 Case KVZ 41/17.
 Case C/13/615474 / HA ZA 16-959.
By Nicole Daniel
On 13 March 2018 Teva appeared at a closed-doors antitrust hearing in Brussels to contest EU pay-for-delay charges (COMP/39.686).
In April 2011 the European Commission opened an investigation against Teva and Cephalon, both pharmaceutical companies, for a 2005 pay-for-delay agreement. This investigation was a consequence of the 2009 sector inquiry of the pharmaceutical sector which had resulted in an EU policy of penalizing pay-for-delay settlements. This sector inquiry identified structural issues and companies’ practices that led to competition distortions. The Commission also recommend a stronger enforcement of patent settlements. Accordingly, these settlements are now monitored by the Commission on an annual basis.
Furthermore, this is the fourth pay-for-delay antitrust case opened after the sector inquiry. In Lundbeck (COMP/39.226), Servier (COMP/39.612) and Johnson & Johnson (COMP/39.685), the respective pharmaceutical companies were fined by the Commission. On 8 September 2016 the General Court upheld the Lundbeck Commission decision, thereby confirming the Commission’s finding that pay-for-delay agreements are a restriction by object, i.e. treating such an arrangement as infringement regardless of whether it has an anticompetitive effect. In the Servier case, the appeal to the General Court is still pending. The Johnson & Johnson case was not appealed.
The Teva case regards modafinil, a sleep-disorder drug. The patents for modafinil and its manufacture were owned by Cephalon but after certain patents expired, Teva entered the market with its generic version for a few months. A lawsuit for alleged patent infringement followed and the litigation in the UK and the U.S. was settled with a world-wide pay-for-delay agreement. In 2005 Teva received $ 125 million to delay the sale of generic modafinil. The agreement saw Teva taking modafinil off the market until October 2012. In the meantime, Cephalon became a subsidiary of Teva.
In the U.S. the same deal was also investigated by the authorities; this probe, however; was concluded with a $ 1.2 billion settlement.
On 17 July 2018 Teva received a Statement of Objections from the Commission. At that time Teva commented that it “strongly disagreed” with the Commission’s approach to patent settlements in the pharmaceutical industry. The Commission’s view is that substantial harm to health service budgets and EU patients may have been caused by the agreement, since it led to higher prices for modafinil.
It is possible for companies to respond in writing and in person to a Statement of Objections. On 13 March 2018 Teva therefore attended a closed-doors hearing in Brussels to respond to the allegations above.
It should be noted that since Teva had already started marketing its generic version of modafinil, this aspect could be an important element in deciding whether the market suffered due to that agreement. In other pay-for-delay cases, the pharmaceutical companies often argued that there was no anticompetitive intent or effect since no generic version, i.e. a rival product, had launched. However, this line of defense might not be applicable here.
It remains to be seen how the Commission will respond to Teva’s arguments.